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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-2-2(3)0), 78-2-2(4), and 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude, as a matter of law, that New York 
law, rather than Utah law, governed the interpretation of an automobile insurance policy 
("the policy") issued by plaintiff/appellee Travelers/Aetna Insurance Company 
("Travelers") to defendant/appellant Keith Wilson ("Wilson") where the policy was 
negotiated in New York, the policy was issued in New York, the policy was paid for in 
New York, the policy insured an automobile registered and garaged in New York, and 
Wilson was domiciled in New York? This issue was raised in Travelers' motion for 
summary judgment and supporting memorandum. R. 122, 125. 
Standard of Review. On appeal, a trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness and without deference. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 
927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996). 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude, as a matter of law, that because 
Wilson and Trisha received benefits from negligent parties greater than the supplemental 
underinsured motorist ("SUM") benefits available under the policy, New York law and 
the policy precluded the Wilson's claim for SUM benefits. This issue was raised in 
Travelers' motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum. R. 122, 125. 
Standard of Review. On appeal, a trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness and without deference. American NatT Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 
927P.2dl86, 188 (Utah 1996). 
3. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion in denying the Wilson's 
motion to amend their answer to Travelers' complaint where the Wilson's filed the 
motion to amend nearly two years after filing their answer and the amendment would 
have prejudiced Travelers? This issue was raised in Travelers' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Amend Their Answer and Counterclaim. R. 103. 
Standard of review. Denial of a motion for leave to amend is within the broad 
discretion of the trial court and this Court will not disturb a trial court's ruling absent a 
showing of an abuse of that discretion. Mountain Am. Credit Union v. McClellan. 854 
P.2d 590, 592 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
N.Y. Ins. Law § 3420(f)(2)(A) 
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 60-2.1(c) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for declaratory relief. Travelers sought a judgment from the trial 
court below declaring that Wilson and his minor daughter, Trisha, are not entitled to 
supplementary underinsured motorist ("SUM") benefits under the automobile insurance 
policy Travelers issued to Wilson in the state of New York. Travelers and Wilson filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
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of Travelers declaring that Wilson and Trisha are not entitled to SUM benefits as a matter 
of law. The trial court held that because New York had the most significant relationship 
to the parties and the policy, New York law governed the construction of the policy. 
Further, the trial court held that because both New York law and the insurance contract 
allowed Travelers to offset any amounts Wilson and Trisha received from negligent 
parties against the SUM benefits available under the policy, Travelers had no obligation 
to pay SUM benefits to Wilson and Tricia. Additionally, the trial court denied the 
Wilson's motion for leave to amend their answer because the amendment was untimely 
and prejudicial to Travelers. The Wilson's appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July 5, 1996, Wilson renewed an automobile insurance policy 
(047SG0036207069 PAH 0) ("the policy") issued to him in the State of New York by 
Travelers/Aetna Insurance Company ("Travelers").1 R. 146. When Wilson renewed the 
policy, he was living in the State of New York and he listed his address on the "Amended 
Declarations" page as: 12132 Angel Road, Lot 27, Silver Creek, New York, 14136. R. 
146, 192: 4-5. 
2. Wilson negotiated for and purchased the policy in New York. R. 192: 32. 
The policy insured a 1993 Plymouth Voyager van that Wilson purchased in July 1996 and 
1
 While the policy was actually issued by Aetna Insurance Company, Aetna was 
subsequently acquired by Travelers Insurance Company. Accordingly, Travelers and 
Aetna are collectively referred to as "Travelers." 
3 
which he registered with the State of New York. R. 192: 32. 
3. The policy had personal liability limits of $25,000 per person, $50,000 per 
accident, and $10,000 for property damage. R. 146. Wilson also purchased optional 
supplementary underinsured motorists ("SUM") coverage with limits of $25,000 per 
person, $50,000 per accident. R. 146. The policy also included mandatory personal 
injury protection ("PIP") benefits of $50,000 as required under New York law. R. 146. 
4. The "Automobile Amended Declarations" page of the policy contains the 
following statement: 
Supplementary Uninsured Motorist (SUM) 
The maximum amount payable under SUM coverage shall be the policy's 
SUM limits reduced and thus offset by motor vehicle bodily injury liability 
insurance policy or bond payments received from, or on behalf of, any 
negligent party involved in the accident. 
R. 147. This statement is also included in the policy's SUM endorsement. R. 170. 
5. Prior to July 21, 1996, Wilson was employed as a professional truck driver. 
R. 192: 199-200. On or about June 30, 1996, Wilson and his daughter Trisha, then 10 
years-old, left New York and embarked on a long-haul, cross-country trip for Mr. 
Wilson's employer, PST Trucking. R. 267: 4-5; 378-379. 
6. Wilson's wife and youngest daughter remained in New York 
where Wilson's wife continued to work. R. 192: 36, 38, 45. Additionally, Wilson's 1993 
Plymouth Voyager van, insured under the policy, remained in New York. R. 192: 42. 
7. Wilson intended to eventually move his family to Utah and he requested 
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that his dispatcher route him through Utah for a couple days during the long-haul trip so 
that he could visit friends and look at apartments in the Salt Lake area. R. 378-379. 
8. Wilson's trip for PST took he and Trisha to various states before 
they arrived in Salt Lake City on July 18, 1996. R. 267: 6. Wilson planned to spend a 
couple days in Utah before he and Trisha continued on to Oregon and then Seattle, 
Washington where Wilson was to drop the load he was hauling. R. 192: 34-35. 
9. On July 21, 1996, Wilson and Trisha were riding as passengers in a vehicle 
owned and operated by their friend in Salt Lake City when the vehicle was involved in an 
accident with two other vehicles. R. 192: 17-18. Wilson and Trisha sustained injuries as 
a result of the accident. R. 192: 21; 267: 9. 
10. Wilson and Trisha received treatment for their injuries in Salt Lake City 
hospitals. R. 192: 47. After Wilson was released from the hospital on August 4, 1996, he 
and Trisha spent a couple more days in Salt Lake City and then returned to New York 
where Wilson received further treatment for his injuries. R. 192: 47-48. 
11. Following the accident, Wilson and Trisha received more than 
$25,000.00 each when they settled their claims against negligent parties. R. 4, 48. 
12. Wilson and Trisha both claimed and received from Travelers approximately 
$50,000.00 each in personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits available under the policy. 
R. 118,131,292-299. 
13. Wilson and Trisha also sought to collect $25,000.00 each in SUM benefits 
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under the policy. R. 5, 34, 118. 
14. At the time of the accident, Wilson did not have a Utah address, did not 
own real estate in Utah, and had not rented an apartment in Utah. R. 192: 40-41. Wilson 
had filled out two Utah apartment applications. R. 192: 43. 
15. At the time of the accident, Wilson did not have any personal belongings in 
Utah other than what he had on his person and in his truck. R. 192: 40. 
16. At the time of the accident, Wilson's driver's license was issued by the 
State of New York. R. 192: 41. 
17. At the time of the accident, Wilson's children were enrolled in New York 
public schools. R. 192: 63. 
18. At the time of the accident, Wilson was registered to vote in New York. R. 
192: 53. 
19. At the time of the accident, Wilson paid income taxes to the State of New 
York. R. 192: 53-54. 
20. At the time of the accident, Wilson's wife lived and worked in New York, 
paid New York state income taxes, had a New York driver's license, and was registered 
to vote in New York. R. 192: 45, 53. 
21. At the time of the accident, Wilson's 1993 Plymouth Voyager van remained 
with his wife in New York. R. 192: 42. The van was registered with the State of New 
York. 192:32. 
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22. Prior to and after the accident, Wilson listed his address as 12132 Angel 
Road, Lot 27, Silver Creek, New York, 14136. R. 192: 60, 62. Wilson received mail at 
this address after the accident - including insurance benefits. R. 192: 60. 
23. After the accident, Wilson applied for disability benefits in New York and 
listed his address as 12132 Angel Road, Lot 27, Silver Creek, New York, 14136. R. 192: 
61-62. 
24. On September 26, 1996, Wilson's attorney sent a letter to Wilson's insurer 
stating: "Keith Wilson is a resident of Silver Creek, New York." R. 118. 
25. On or about May 20, 1997, Travelers filed a complaint for declaratory relief 
wherein Travelers alleged that Wilson and Trisha "were New York residents up to and 
including the time of the accident." R. 1,5. Wilson and Trisha admitted the allegation in 
their answer. R. 33, 35. 
26. The Wilson's eventually moved to Salt Lake City in November 1996. R. 
54. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: This case involves a conflict between Utah law and New York 
law with respect to underinsured motorist coverage. The trial court properly concluded 
that because New York has the "most significant relationship" to the parties and the 
policy, New York law, not Utah law, governs the construction of the Wilson's policy. 
Travelers and Wilson negotiated and contracted in New York. Travelers issued the policy 
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for delivery in New York and Wilson paid the policy premium in New York. The policy 
insured an automobile registered and garaged in New York. Wilson was domiciled in 
New York. Although the automobile accident occurred in Utah, New York had more 
significant contacts with the parties and the policy and New York law should govern 
construction of the policy. 
POINT II: The trial court properly concluded that both New York law and the 
express terms of the policy provide that any amounts Wilson and Trisha received from 
negligent parties are to be offset against the supplementary underinsured benefits 
available under Wilson's policy. Because Wilson contracted for SUM benefits with 
limits of $25,000.00 per person and $50,000.00 per accident, Wilson's and Trisha's 
recovery of payments in excess of these amounts from the negligent parties precludes 
them from collecting SUM benefits under the policy. Utah's underinsured motorist laws 
do not govern the New York insurance policy Wilson contracted for and purchased. 
POINT III: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Wilson's 
motion to amend their answer. The Wilson's did not file the motion until nearly two 
years after they filed their answer and did not give sufficient justification for their delay. 
Moreover, the proposed amendment was prejudicial to Travelers. The motion was 
properly denied. 
POINT IV: The Wilson's motion to amend their counterclaim is not properly 
before this Court and the Court should not consider it. At the Wilson's request, the trial 
court never considered or ruled on the Wilson's motion. There is no decision to appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE NEW YORK HAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PARTIES AND THE POLICY, THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT NEW YORK 
LAW GOVERNS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE POLICY. 
This case involves a conflict of law question which the trial court correctly 
resolved in favor of Travelers. At issue is whether Wilson and Trisha are entitled to SUM 
benefits under the policy. Under New York law, payments Wilson and Trisha received 
from negligent parties must be offset against the SUM benefits available under the policy. 
See Point II, infra. However, under Utah law, Wilson and Trisha may "stack" the benefits 
received from negligent parties with the benefits available under the policy. Id A 
choice of law problem exists here because New York has contacts to the policy, Utah has 
contacts with the accident, and the states have different local law rules regarding 
automobile insurance coverage. The trial court correctly concluded the problem that New 
York has the more significant relationship to the policy and that New York law governs 
the construction of the policy. 
When there is a conflict between different rules of local law relative to a contract 
dispute, Utah courts are to apply the "most significant relationship" test to determine 
which law governs the contract. American Naf 1 Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 927 
P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1996). In American National the Utah Supreme Court applied this 
test to determine whether Utah law or Idaho law governed the interpretation of an 
automobile insurance policy. After finding that a conflict existed between Utah law and 
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Idaho law with respect to performance of the policy, the court stated: 
Under Restatement of Conflict § 205 cmt. b, "questions involving the extent 
of contractual obligations are determined by the law chosen by the parties if 
they have made an effective choice . . . . Otherwise, these questions are 
determined by the law selected by the application of § 188." 
Id. at 188 (omission in original). The court then quoted the relevant portions of 
Restatement of Conflict (Second) § 188: 
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in 
contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to 
that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the 
parties under the principles stated in § 6. 
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties . . ., the 
contacts to be taken into account in . . . [determining] the law applicable to 
an issue include: 
(a) the place of contracting, 
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract, 
(c) the place of performance, 
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and 
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation 
and place of business of the parties. 
American National, 927 P.2d at 188 (emphasis in original) (omissions in original) 
(modification in original). The court then considered the contacts of both Utah and Idaho 
to the policy and the parties. 
In this case, because there is no effective choice of law, the trial court considered 
the contacts of both New York and Utah to the policy and parties and determined that 
New York had the more significant relationship to both. Based on the undisputed facts 
and after considering the Section 188 factors, the trial court concluded that New York had 
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the most significant relationship. 
A. New York was the Place of Contracting. 
There is no dispute that Travelers and Wilson entered into the contract for 
automobile insurance in the State of New York. Further, the contract was executed in 
New York. To be sure, the policy conforms to New York law and contains the requisite 
elements for automobile insurance policies issued in New York. For example, the policy 
includes PIP benefits with mandatory limits of $50,000.00 as required by New York law. 
B. The Contract Was Negotiated in New York. 
There is no dispute that Travelers and Wilson negotiated the contract in New York. 
Indeed, because the policy was negotiated in New York, the policy contains the requisite 
elements for automobile insurance policies issued in New York. 
C. The Contract Was Performed in New York. 
There is no dispute that Travelers issued the policy for delivery in New York and 
there is no dispute that Wilson paid the policy premium in New York. At the time of 
contracting, Wilson and his family resided in New York. In fact, Wilson listed his 
address on the policy as 12132 Angell Rd. Lot 27, Silver Creek, New York. R. 146. 
Furthermore, the automobile insured by the policy, the 1993 Plymouth Voyager van, was 
registered and garaged in New York, and remained in New York at all material times. 
At the time of contracting, both Travelers and Wilson expected to perform their 
contractual obligations in New York. Wilson paid his premium in New York. Travelers 
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issued the policy for delivery in New York and assessed Wilson's premium based on the 
facts that the policy was issued for delivery in New York to a New York resident and 
insured an automobile titled and garaged in New York. 
While Wilson claims that he informed the insurance agency where he purchased 
the policy that he intended to move to Utah, Wilson testified that he did not tell the 
agency when or even where he intended to move. R. 192: 52-53. Rather, his talk of 
moving was "just hometown talk" and casual remarks made "to the girls in passing in the 
[insurance agency's] office." R. 192: 52-53, 57. Moreover, Wilson testified that the first 
time that he directly informed Travelers that he was moving to Salt Lake City was 
September of 1996, two months after his accident. R. 192: 58-59. 
While Wilson was out of New York performing a long-haul trip in July 1996, 
Wilson's wife and the insured van remained in New York. R. 192: 42. Accordingly, in 
the event Wilson's wife or the van were involved in an accident, New York continued to 
be the site where the policy's proceeds were most likely to be paid. Additionally, because 
Wilson had yet to establish residence outside of New York when the accident occurred, 
the proceeds were most likely to be paid to Wilson in New York. 
Moreover, after the accident, Wilson received treatment for his injuries in New 
York and made claims on the policy while he was living in New York. R. 192: 48-49, 60. 
Although Wilson and Trisha may have received some benefits under the policy while they 
were being treated in Utah, the facts, taken as a whole, clearly establish that the principal 
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place of performance for the policy was New York. As stated by the trial court below, 
As to the place of performance, it appears that the more compelling 
argument is that of Travelers, although Utah may have received most of the 
insurance proceeds, since the insured automobile was in New York and the 
[Wilson's] were still living in New York, [New York] is the place where 
the proceeds were most likely to be paid. 
R. 463: 25-26. 
D. New York was the Location of the Contract's Subject Matter. 
There is no dispute that the 1993 Plymouth Voyager van insured by the policy 
remained registered and garaged in New York at all material times. Further, there is no 
dispute that Wilson's wife remained in New York and drove the van in New York while 
Wilson was traveling from state to state. When Wilson listed his address as 12132 Angell 
Rd. Lot 27, Silver Creek, New York it was understood that the insured risk, i.e. the van, 
would be garaged and principally located in New York. At the time of the accident, New 
York clearly had more contact with the insured risk than did the state of Utah. 
E. Wilson's and Trisha's Domicile was New York. 
At the time of the accident, Wilson and Trisha were domiciled in New York. 
Although Wilson intended to eventually move his family to Utah, Wilson had not fully 
abandoned his domicile in New York and had not established a domicile in Utah.2 When 
the accident occurred, Wilson's only address was a New York address. Wilson was 
2Because Trisha was ten-years-old at the time of the accident and Wilson was her 
legal guardian, Trisha's domicile follows Wilson's. 
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driving under a New York driver's license. Wilson paid New York income taxes to New 
York. Wilson was registered to vote in New York. Furthermore, Wilson's wife and 
youngest daughter continued to live in New York and Wilson's wife paid New York 
income taxes, had a New York driver's license, and was registered to vote in New York. 
Moreover, at the time of the accident, Wilson and Trisha were only in Utah temporarily. 
They were en route to Oregon and ultimately Washington where Wilson was to deliver 
the load he was hauling for his employer. Taken as a whole, these facts establish that 
while Wilson and his family may have intended to relocate to Utah, Wilson had not 
abandoned his domicile in New York when the accident occurred. 
This Court has discussed the requirements for "domicile" and "residence" in a 
variety of contexts. Generally, the concept of domicile and residence arises in tax cases 
with the issue being whether a person is obligated to pay Utah taxes. See Clements v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n. 893 P.2d 1078 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995), Lassche v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n. 866 P.2d 618 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993), Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 864 P.2d 
904 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). In Lassche. this Court observed that: 
"Domicile" means the place where an individual has a true, fixed, 
permanent home and principal establishment, and to which place he [or she] 
has (whenever he [or she] is absent) the intention of returning. It is the 
place in which a person has voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself [or 
herself] and family, not for a mere temporary purpose, but with the present 
intention of making a permanent home. After domicile has been 
established, two things are necessary to create a new domicile; first, an 
abandonment of the old domicile; and second, the intention and 
establishment of a new domicile. The intention to abandon a domicile once 
established is not of itself sufficient to create a new domicile; for before a 
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person can be said to have changed his or her domicile, a new domicile 
must be shown. 
866 P.2d at 620 (quoting Utah Code of Administrative Procedure Rule R865-9-2I(D)) 
(modifications in original) (emphasis added). To determine whether an individual has 
established a domicile in Utah, this Court considers a number of factors including an 
individual's provision of funds to support his family's residence in the state, the location 
of an individual's bank accounts, and the individual's mailing address. See Orton v. State 
Tax Comm'n. 864 P.2d 904 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). Similarly, to determine if an individual 
has established a domicile in Utah, the Utah Supreme Court considers such factors as 
whether the individual registered a vehicle in Utah, owns property within the state, 
possesses a Utah driver's license,.is registered to vote in Utah, and uses a Utah mailing 
address. See O'Rourke v. State Tax Comm'n. 830 P.2d 230 (Utah 1992). Although this 
case is not a "tax" case, the foregoing principles provide the appropriate framework for 
determining whether Wilson was domiciled in and a resident of Utah at the time of the 
accident.3 
At the time of the accident, Wilson's domicile was New York, not Utah. Prior to 
the accident, Wilson had clearly established domicile in New York. Wilson supported his 
family's residence in New York, used a New York mailing address, paid New York 
Additionally, in Allen v. Greyhound Lines. Inc.. 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978), the 
Utah Supreme Court looked to Utah's statutory provisions pertaining to voting to 
determine if an individual was domiciled in Utah and could avail herself of Utah's statute 
of limitation relating to a personal injury claim. 
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income taxes, registered his vehicle in New York, registered to vote in New York, 
possessed a New York driver's license, and enrolled his children in New York public 
schools. Under Lassche, 866 P.2d at 620, in order for Wilson to become domiciled in 
Utah, Wilson first had to abandon his New York domicile, and second, establish a new 
domicile in Utah. Although Wilson contends that he abandoned his New York domicile 
and intended to establish a domicile in Utah, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Wilson 
had not actually established a domicile in Utah at the time of the accident. 
When the accident occurred, Wilson's address was in New York, Wilson was 
driving under a New York driver's license, Wilson was registered to vote in New York, 
Wilson's vehicle was registered in New York, Wilson's children were enrolled in New 
York public schools, Wilson and his wife paid New York income taxes, and Wilson's 
wife and youngest daughter continued to live in New York. Indeed, when the accident 
occurred, Wilson and Trisha were only in Utah for a couple days and were en route to 
Portland and Washington. Further, after the accident, Wilson and Trisha returned to New 
York to convalesce and receive medical treatment. Wilson may have filled out apartment 
applications while visiting Utah, however that fact does not outweigh the numerous, 
substantive contacts Wilson maintained with New York. Simply put, Wilson had none of 
the contacts that this Court and the Utah Supreme Court consider as evidence of the 
establishment of a Utah domicile. As stated by the trial court below, "While it is apparent 
that the Wilsons intended to make Utah their new home, it appears, based on the 
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undisputed facts, that they had not fully abandoned New York." R. 463: 26-27. 
Clearly, New York had the most significant relationship to the parties and the 
policy. Accordingly, under Restatement (Second) of Conflict § 188, New York law 
governs the interpretation of the policy. Utah may have been the site of the accident and 
Wilson and Trisha may have received medical treatment in Utah, however that is the full 
extent of Utah's contact to the parties and the policy. Where New York was the place of 
contracting, the place of negotiating, the place of performance, the location of the insured 
risk, and the domicile of Wilson, New York had the most significant contacts with the 
parties and the policy. 
The case of American Nat'l. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 927 P. 2d 186 
(Utah 1996) is controlling authority on this issue. In American Nat'l Fire Ins.. an insurer 
filed an action for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that Idaho law governed the 
interpretation of an automobile insurance policy that had been negotiated and issued in 
Idaho to an Idaho resident and which insured an automobile that was registered and 
garaged in Idaho. The insureds were driving the insured automobile in Utah when they 
were involved in an automobile accident. Following the accident, the parties disputed 
whether a "step-down provision" in the Idaho policy was enforceable in Utah. After 
finding that a conflict existed between Idaho and Utah law on the issue, the court applied 
the "most significant relationship" test to determine which state's law governed 
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interpretation of the policy.4 Notably, in doing so, the Court joined courts in Colorado, 
Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon in rejecting the location of the accident as the 
determinative factor for choice of law questions. Id at 189-90. 
The Court then determined that Idaho law governed the construction of the policy 
because Idaho had the most significant relationship to the parties and policy. Id. at 191. 
Specifically, the Court found that the policy was negotiated and executed in Idaho and 
insured an Idaho resident and automobile registered and garaged in Idaho. Id. at 188-89. 
The Court held that Idaho's contacts were not outweighed by the fact that the accident 
occurred in Utah. L± at 190. 
Critical to the Court's holding was a desire to protect the justified expectations of 
the parties. The Court stated: "[I]n contracts,... there is but one basic policy, namely 
protection of the expectations of the parties." American National 927 P.2d at 191 
(internal quotation omitted) (modification in original) (omission in original). The Court 
then held that "To protect justified expectation and predictability of result as intended by 
4In deciding that the "most significant relationship" test governed the resolution of 
the conflict of law issue, the Court held that the case of Watson v. Employers Liability 
Assurance Corp.. 348 U.S. 66, 75 S. Ct. 166, 99 L. Ed. 74 (1954) was "inapposite" to the 
American National case because Watson "involved the right to bring a direct action 
against an insurer - strictly a procedural issue - rather than the substantive content of the 
contract or the rights of the parties to damages." American National, 927 P.2d at 189. 
Watson is likewise inapposite in this case because the substantive content of Wilson's 
policy and his right to policy proceeds are at issue, not procedure. Accordingly, Wilson's 
reliance on the Watson case is misplaced in light of the Utah Supreme Court's holding in 
American National. 
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Restatement of Conflict section 6, we must hold that the parties to an automobile 
insurance contract cannot change their bargain or have the bargain changed for them 
every time they drive across a state line." Id 
In this case, Travelers and Wilson expected that the policy would be constructed in 
accordance with New York law. The policy was issued and negotiated in New York, 
conformed to New York law, insured property located in New York, and was issued to a 
New York resident. By seeking to apply Utah law to the construction of the policy, 
Wilson seeks alter the agreed upon terms of the policy. The fact that Wilson was 
involved in an accident in Utah does not justify alteration of his policy. 
This Court should follow the Utah Supreme Court's holding in American National. 
The Wilson's accident may have occurred in Utah, however that factor does not outweigh 
the significant contacts that New York had with the parties and the policy. New York law 
had the "most significant relationship" to the parties and policy and its law should govern 
the construction of the policy. The justified expectations of the parties compel such a 
result. 
II. BECAUSE WILSON AND TRISHA RECEIVED PAYMENTS FROM 
NEGLIGENT PARTIES IN EXCESS OF THE "SUM" BENEFITS 
AVAILABLE UNDER THE POLICY, THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT WILSON AND TRISHA ARE 
NOT ENTITLED TO "SUM" BENEFITS UNDER THE POLICY. 
Wilson and Trisha received more than $25,000.00 each in payments from the 
insurers of the negligent parties. Both New York law and the express terms of the policy 
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provide that any amounts Wilson and Trisha received from negligent parties are to be 
offset against the SUM benefits available under Wilson's policy. Because Wilson 
contracted for SUM benefits with limits of $25,000.00 per person and $50,000.00 per 
accident, Wilson's and Trisha's recovery of payments in excess of these amounts from the 
negligent parties precludes them from collecting SUM benefits under the policy. Wilson 
and Trisha are not entitled to SUM benefits because New York law allows for offsets and 
Utah underinsured motorist law does not apply to the policy. 
A. New York Law and The Policy Allow for Offset. 
New York law allows for offsets with respect to underinsured motorist coverage 
and precludes "stacking" of benefits. Likewise, the policy expressly provided for offsets. 
N.Y. Ins. Law § 3420 (f)(2)(A) states, in pertinent part: 
Any such [policy of motor vehicle liability insurance] shall, at the option of 
the insured, also provide supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorists 
insurance for bodily injury, in an amount up to the bodily injury liability 
insurance limits of coverage provided under such policy . . . . 
Supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorists insurance shall provide 
coverage, in any state or Canadian province, if the limits of liability under 
all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies of another motor 
vehicle liable for damages are in a lesser amount than the bodily injury 
liability insurance limits of covered provided by such policy. 
Additionally, the New York Insurance Department promulgated N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & 
Regs. tit. 11, § 60-2.1 [Basics of SUM coverage] (c) which states: 
The maximum amount payable under the SUM coverage shall be the 
policy's SUM limit reduced and thus offset by motor vehicle bodily injury 
liability insurance policy or bond payments received from, or on behalf of, 
any negligent party involved in the accident. 
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Together, these provisions provide that (a) SUM benefits are optional coverage that an 
insured may elect to purchase, (b) the insured may only purchase SUM benefits in 
amounts equal to or less than the insured's limits for bodily injury liability, and (c) if 
purchased, SUM benefits are only available if the insured is injured by a negligent party 
with limits of coverage less than those of the insured. Because Wilson and Trisha were 
injured by parties with bodily injury liability limits equal to and greater than Wilson's 
limits, Wilson and Trisha are not entitled to SUM benefits. 
Wilson's policy has bodily injury liability limits of $25,000.00 per person, $50,000 
per accident. Here, Wilson and Trisha each received in excess of $25,000.00 from the 
negligent parties' insurers. Consequently, under New York law, Wilson and Trisha are 
not entitled to SUM benefits. 
Furthermore, the policy itself expressly provides that Wilson will only be paid 
SUM benefits if he is injured by negligent parties with bodily injury liability insurance 
limits less than Wilson's own bodily injury liability limits. Specifically, the policy stated 
on both the "Automobile Policy Amended Declarations" page and on the "SUM" 
endorsement that: 
The maximum amount payable under the SUM coverage shall be the 
policy's SUM limit reduced and thus offset by motor vehicle bodily injury 
liability insurance policy or bond payment received from, or on behalf of, 
any negligent party involved in the accident. 
R. 147, 170. The policy complied with New York law and gave Wilson notice that the 
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SUM benefits he contracted for would only be paid if he was injured by a party with 
liability limits less than his own. 
Accordingly, under both New York law and the express terms of the policy, 
Wilson and Trisha are not entitled to SUM benefits under the policy. 
B. Utah Underinsured Motorist Law Does Not Apply to The Policy. 
Contrary to Wilson's and Trisha's assertions, Utah's uninsured/underinsured 
motorist coverage statute does not apply to this case. While Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
305 does require Utah policies to contain underinsured motorist coverage and does allow 
for "stacking" of benefits, the statute's requirements do not apply to the Wilson's policy 
because the policy was not issued for delivery in Utah, did not insure property ordinarily 
located in Utah, and did not insure persons residing in the state when it was issued. 
The applicability of Section 31A-22-305 is governed by Section 31A-21-101 
("Scope of Title 31 A, Chapters 21 and 22") which provides that: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) through (6), this chapter 
and Chapter 22 apply to all insurance policies, applications, and certificates: 
(a) delivered or issued for delivery in this state; 
(b) on property ordinarily located in this state; 
(c) on persons residing in this state when the policy is issued; 
and 
(d) on business operations in this state. 
Here, the policy at issue is clearly beyond the scope of Section 31A-22-305 because it 
was issued in New York to a New York resident and insured property located in New 
York. Accordingly, the Wilson's reliance on the statute is misplaced. 
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Moreover, under the "most significant relationship" test discussed at Point I, supra, 
New York law governs the construction of the policy and Wilson's and Trisha's claims 
for benefits. 
Additionally, the Court will note that Wilson and Trisha readily availed themselves 
of New York law - the law which they now seek to avoid - with regard to their recovery 
of PIP benefits. New York law is unique in that it requires that automobile insurance 
policies provide mandatory PIP protection with limits of $50,000.00 for each eligible 
person. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 5103; N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 65-1.1. 
Accordingly, after the accident, Travelers paid Wilson and Trisha approximately 
$50,000.00 each in PIP benefits under the policy without the Wilson's having to establish 
fault. New York's PIP scheme is much more generous than Utah's scheme. Under Utah 
law, PIP benefits are limited to only $3,000.00 per person. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-307. While the Wilson's characterize New York's offset provisions as unreasonably 
harsh, New York law is actually quite generous in light of its liberal PIP scheme. 
Because the Wilson's received benefits from the negligent parties greater than the 
SUM benefits available under the policy, New York law and the policy preclude the 
Wilson's recovery of SUM benefits. Further, Utah law has no application to Wilson's 
New York policy and the Wilson's are not entitled to "stack" benefits. The Wilson's 
collection of PIP benefits in accordance with New York law evidences their intent to rely 
on New York insurance law. The trial court properly concluded, as a matter of law, that 
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Wilson and Trisha are not entitled to SUM benefits under the policy. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING WILSON'S AND TRISHA'S MOTION TO AMEND 
THEIR ANSWER. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilson's and Trisha's motion 
to amend their answer where the motion was not timely filed and amendment would be 
prejudicial to Travelers. Travelers filed its complaint for declaratory relief on May 22, 
1997. R. 1. The Wilson's, through counsel, accepted service of process on June 12, 
1997. R. 32. In the complaint, Travelers alleged that Wilson and Trisha were residents of 
New York when the accident occurred. R. 5. On August 27, 1997, the Wilson's filed an 
answer. R. 33. In their answer, Wilson and Trisha admitted that they were residents of 
New York at the time Wilson contracted for the policy and when the accident occurred. 
R. 33, 35. Nearly two years after filing their answer, on April 27, 1999, Wilson and 
Trisha filed a motion for leave to amend their answer in order to deny that they were 
residents of New York when the accident occurred. R. 95. The basis for their motion 
was that their counsel had "inadvertently" admitted the allegations regarding the Wilson's 
New York residency. R. 95. Travelers opposed the Wilson's motion because the motion 
was untimely and because Travelers had relied on the Wilson's admissions regarding their 
New York residency. R. 103. 
Although Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to 
amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, the trial court concluded that 
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amendment was not justified. The Wilson's motion to amend their answer was filed 
nearly two years after they filed their answer. The Wilson's offered no justification for 
their delay in seeking to amend. Most importantly, in their answer the Wilson's admitted 
that they were residents of New York - a determinative factor in this case - and Travelers 
proceeded under that admission. The trial court therefore denied the Wilson's motion for 
leave to amend because the amendment was not timely and prejudicial to Travelers. R. 
436. 
In Atcitty v. San Juan County School Dist. 967 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999), this Court stated that in ruling on a motion 
to amend: 
Utah courts should consider the following factors in determining whether to 
allow amendment: (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for 
the delay; and (3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party. 
Here, the trial court considered these factors and determined that the Wilson's proposed 
amendment should not be allowed. Trial courts are afforded broad discretion in ruling on 
motions to amend and this Court will not overrule the trial court's decision absent an 
abuse of that discretion. Id See also. Mountain Am. Credit Union v. McClellan. 854 
P.2d 590, 592 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Wilson's motion to 
amend their answer and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. Of course, in the 
event this Court affirms the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Travelers, 
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the Court need not consider the trial court's ruling on the motion to amend. 
IV. PURSUANT TO THE WILSON'S REQUEST, THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT RULE ON THE WILSON'S MOTION TO AMEND THEIR 
COUNTERCLAIM AND THE MOTION IS NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The Wilson's filed a motion for leave to amend both their answer and 
counterclaim on April 27, 1999. R. 89. On December 8, 1999, the Wilson's filed a 
"Notice to Submit Motion to Amend for Decision". R. 430. In their notice, the Wilson's 
stated: 
The parties have stipulated that if the court is willing[,] the portion of [the 
Wilson's] motion that deals with amending the Answer can be considered 
by the court at the hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment, 
December 9, 1999. The court should disregard the parts of [the Wilson's] 
Motion to Amend the Counterclaim. [The Wilson's have] agreed to re-file 
the motion to amend the counter claim separately at a later date. 
R. 430. Accordingly, at the December 9, 1999 hearing, the trial court only considered the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and the Wilson's motion to amend their 
answer. The trial court granted Travelers motion for summary judgment, denied the 
Wilson's motion for summary judgment, and denied the Wilson's motion to amend their 
answer. R. 435. The Wilson's never submitted their motion to amend their counterclaim 
for decision and the trial court never considered or ruled on the motion. 
Consequently, the Wilson's motion to amend their counterclaim is not at issue in 
this appeal and not properly before this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Travelers. Likewise, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of the Wilson's 
motion to amend their answer. New York law, not Utah law, governs the resolution of 
this coverage dispute because New York had the most significant relationship to the 
parties and the policy. Although Wilson may have intended to move to Utah when he was 
injured, Utah was not his home. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, "A man's home is 
where he makes it, not where he would like to have it." Allen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.. 
583 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1978). At all relevant times, Wilson's home was made in New 
York. At the time of the accident, Wilson did not have sufficient ties to Utah to justify 
applying Utah law to his New York automobile insurance policy. Accordingly, because 
New York law governs the construction of Wilson's policy, Wilson is not entitled to 
SUM benefits under the policy. The trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this U ^fday of December, 2001. 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
TERRY M. PLANT 
H. JUSTIN HITT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Travelers/Aetna 
Insurance Company 
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Order granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment dated 1/20/99 
TERRY M. PLANT, UBN 2610 
JASON M. KERR, UBN 8222 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 E. South Temple, Ste. 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (301) 363-7611 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRAVELERS/AETNA INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
KEITH WILSON and TRISHA 
WILSON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 970903601 CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
The Court, having considered the plaintiff's and defendants' 
cross motions for summary judgment, and the defendants' motion to 
amend their answer, and the matter having come before the Court for 
oral arguments at a regularly scheduled hearing on Thursday, 
December 9, 1999 at 10:30 a.m., the Court finds and orders as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Travelers/Aetna Insurance Company's motion for 
summary judgment is hereby granted. 
0 0 0 4 3 5 
2. Defendants Keith Wilson and Trisha Wilson's motion for 
summary judgment is hereby denied. 
3. Defendants Keith Wilson and Trisha Wilson's motion to. 
amend their answer is hereby denied. 
4. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted and 
defendants' motion for summary judgment judgement is denied for two 
reasons: (a) New York law applies to this contract under the most 
significant relationship tests as described in the Utah Supreme 
Court decision of American National Fire Ins. v. Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange, 927 P.2d 186 (Utah 1986); and, (b) even if Utah law 
applied to the interpretation of the insurance contract between 
plaintiff and defendant, Utah law does not bar the use of offsets 
to reduce any amounts received by the defendants from the 
tortfeasor against the SUM benefits under the insurance contract. 
5. Defendants' motion to amend their answer is denied as it 
is untimely and any amendment to the answer would be prejudicial to 
the plaintiff. 
0 0 0 4 3 6 
s*y 
DATED this Cl6 day of J a n 1999, 
BY THE COURT: 
L 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Addendum 2 
Notice to Submit Motion to Amend Answer dated 12/8/99 
Steve S. Christensen, P.C. 
Steve S. Christensen (6156) 
Attorney for Defendants 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1160 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 322-0591 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0592 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRAVELERS/AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEITH WILSON AND TRISHA WILSON, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT MOTION TO 
AMEND ANSWER 
Civil No. 970903601 CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
The parties have stipulated that if the court is willing the portion of Defendant's 
motion that deals with amending the Answer can be considered by the court at the 
hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment, December 9, 1999. The court should 
disregard the parts of the Defendanat's Motion to Amend the Counter Claim. Defendant 
has agreed to re-file the motion to amend the counter claim separately at a later date. 
Attached to this notice to submit is a copy of Defendant's motion, Plaintiffs 
opposition and Defendant's Reply to motion to amend answer only. 
00 0 4 30 
^ 
.3 W 
'XZD £37TJC7 CCUR"; 
Third Judicial District 
>-<-»<»» i_- ,_ COUNTY 
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DATED this $ ' h day of December 1999. 
Steve S. Christensen 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that an copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT MOTION 
TO AMEND ANSWER was hand delivered on the g ^ _ day of December 1999 to: 
Jason Kerr 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Fax #531-9747 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Addendum 3 
N.Y. Ins. Law § 3420(f)(2)(A) 
Service Get by LEXSTAT® 
TOC New York Consolidated 
Citation 
NY CLS Ins § 3420 
NEW YORK CONSOLIDATED LAW SERVICE 
Copyright (c) 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 
one of the LEXIS Publishing (TM) companies 
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INSURANCE LAW 
ARTICLE 34. INSURANCE CONTRACTS-PROPERTY/CASUALTY 
• GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
NY CLS Ins § 3420 (2001) 
§ 3420. Liability insurance; standard provisions; right of injured person 
(a) No policy or contract insuring against liability for injury to person, except as stated in 
subsection (g) hereof, or against liability for injury to, or destruction of, property shall be 
issued or delivered in this state, unless it contains in substance the following provisions or 
provisions which are equally or more favorable to the insured and to judgment creditors so 
far as such provisions relate to judgment creditors: 
(1) A provision that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the person insured, or the insolvency of 
his estate, shall not release the insurer from the payment of damages for injury sustained or 
loss occasioned during the life of and within the coverage of such policy or contract. 
(2) A provision that in case judgment against the insured or his personal representative in an 
action brought to recover damages for injury sustained or loss or damage occasioned during 
the life of the policy or contract shall remain unsatisfied at the expiration of thirty days from 
the serving of notice of entry of judgment upon the attorney for the insured, or upon the 
insured, and upon the insurer, then an action may, except during a stay or limited stay of 
execution against the insured on such judgment, be maintained against the insurer under the 
terms of the policy or contract for the amount of such judgment not exceeding the amount of 
the applicable limit of coverage under such policy or contract. 
(3) A provision that notice given by or on behalf of the insured, or written notice by or on 
behalf of the injured person or any other claimant, to any licensed agent of the insurer in this 
state, with particulars sufficient to identify the insured, shall be deemed notice to the insurer 
(4) A provision that failure to give any notice required to be given by such policy within the 
/retneve? m=5ff02d923daaaf351c£26a3cb0377967& fintstr=FULL&docnum=l& startdoc!2/17/2001 
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N.Y Ins. Law 3420 
time prescribed therein shall not invalidate any claim made by the insured or by any other 
claimant if it shall be shown not to have been reasonably possible to give such notice within 
the prescribed time and that notice was given as soon as was reasonably possible. 
(b) Subject to the limitations and conditions of paragraph two of subsection (a) hereof, an 
action may be maintained by the following persons against the insurer upon any policy or 
contract of liability insurance which is governed by such paragraph, to recover the amount of 
a judgment against the insured or his personal representative: 
(1) any person who, or the personal representative of any person who, has obtained a 
judgment against the insured or his personal representative, for damages for injury sustained 
or loss or damage occasioned during the life of the policy or contract; 
(2) any person who, or the personal representative of any person who, has obtained a 
judgment against the insured or his personal representative to enforce a right of contribution 
or indemnity, or any person subrogated to the judgment creditor's rights under such 
judgment; and 
(3) any assignee of a judgment obtained as specified in paragraph one or paragraph two of 
this subsection, subject further to the limitation contained in section 13-103 of the general 
obligations law. 
(c) If an action is maintained against an insurer under the provisions of paragraph two of 
subsection (a) of this section and the insurer alleges in defense that the insured failed or 
refused to cooperate with the insurer in violation of any provision in the policy or contract 
requiring such cooperation, the burden shall be upon the insurer to prove such alleged failure 
or refusal to cooperate. 
(d) If under a liability policy delivered or issued for delivery in this state, an insurer shall 
disclaim liability or deny coverage for death or bodily injury arising out of a motor vehicle 
accident or any other type of accident occurring within this state, it shall give written notice 
as soon as is reasonably possible of such disclaimer of liability or denial of coverage to the 
insured and the injured person or any other claimant. 
(e) No policy or contract of personal injury liability insurance or of property damage liability 
insurance, covering liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or operation of any 
motor vehicle or of any vehicle as defined in section three hundred eighty-eight of the vehicle 
and traffic law, or an aircraft, or any vessel as defined in section forty-eight of the navigation 
law, shall be issued or delivered in this state to the owner thereof, or shall be issued or 
delivered by any authorized insurer upon any such vehicle or aircraft or vessel then 
principally garaged or principally used in this state, unless it contains a provision insuring the 
named insured against liability for death or injury sustained, or loss or damage occasioned 
within the coverage of the policy or contract, as a result of negligence in the operation or use 
of such vehicle, aircraft or vessel, as the case may be, by any person operating or using the 
same with the permission, express or implied, of the named insured. 
(f) (1) No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury 
or death suffered by any natural person arising out of the ownership, maintenance and use of 
a motor vehicle by the insured shall be issued or delivered by any authorized insurer upon 
any motor vehicle then principally garaged or principally used in this state unless it contains 
a provision whereby the insurer agrees that it will pay to the insured, as defined in such 
provision, subject to the terms and conditions set forth therein to be prescribed by the board 
of directors of the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation and approved by the 
superintendent, all sums, not exceeding a maximum amount or limit of twenty-five thousand 
dollars exclusive of interest and costs, on account of injury to and all sums, not exceeding a 
maximum amount or limit of fifty thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs, on account 
of death of one person, in any one accident, and the maximum amount or l imit, subject to 
.../retrieve? m=5ff02d923daaaf351cf26a3cb0377967& fintstr=FULL&docnum=l& startdo 12/17/2001 
such limit for any one person so injured of fifty thousand dollars or so killed of one hundred 
thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, on account of injury to, or death of, more 
than one person in any one accident, which the insured or his legal representative shall be 
entitled to recover as damages from an owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, 
unidentified motor vehicle which leaves the scene of an accident, a motor vehicle registered 
in this state as to which at the time of the accident there was not in effect a policy of liability 
insurance, a stolen vehicle, a motor vehicle operated without permission of the owner, an 
insured motor vehicle where the insurer disclaims liability or denies coverage or an 
unregistered vehicle because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting 
therefrom, sustained by the insured, caused by accident occurring in this state and arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle. No payment for non-
economic loss shall be made under such policy provision to a covered person unless such 
person has incurred a serious injury, as such terms are defined in section five thousand one 
hundred two of this chapter. Such policy shall not duplicate any element of basic economic 
loss provided for under article fifty-one of this chapter. No payments of first party benefits for 
basic economic loss made pursuant to such article shall diminish the obligations of the 
insurer under this policy provision for the payment of non-economic loss and economic loss in 
excess of basic economic loss. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of section three 
thousand four hundred twenty-five of this article, any such policy which does not contain the 
aforesaid provisions shall be construed as if such provisions were embodied therein. 
(2) (A) Any such policy shall, at the option of the insured, also provide supplementary 
uninsured/underinsured motorists insurance for bodily injury, in an amount up to the bodily 
injury liability insurance limits of coverage provided under such policy, subject to a maximum 
of two hundred fifty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in 
any one accident and, subject to such limit for one person, up to five hundred thousand 
dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, or a 
combined single limit policy of five hundred thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or 
death of one or more persons in any one accident. Provided however, an insurer issuing such 
policy, in lieu of offering to the insured the coverages stated above, may provide 
supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorists insurance for bodily injury, in an amount 
up to the bodily injury liability insurance limits of coverage provided under such policy, 
subject to a maximum of one hundred thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death 
of one person in any one accident and, subject to such limit for one person, up to three 
hundred thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any 
one accident, or a combined single limit policy of three hundred thousand dollars because of 
bodily injury to or death of one or more persons in any one accident, if such insurer also 
makes available a personal umbrella policy with liability coverage limits up to at least five 
hundred thousand dollars which also provides coverage for supplementary 
uninsured/underinsured motorists claims. Supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorists 
insurance shall provide coverage, in any state or Canadian province, if the limits of liability 
under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies of another motor vehicle liable for 
damages are in a lesser amount than the bodily injury liability insurance limits of coverage 
provided by such policy. Upon written request by any insured covered by supplemental 
uninsured/underinsured motorists insurance or his duly authorized representative and upon 
disclosure by the insured of the insured's bodily injury and supplemental 
uninsured/underinsured motorists insurance coverage limits, the insurer of any other owner 
or operator of another motor vehicle against which a claim has been made for damages to 
the insured shall disclose, within forty-five days of the request, the bodily injury liability 
insurance limits of its coverage provided under the policy or all bodily injury liability bonds. 
The time of the insured to make any supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorist claim, 
shall be tolled during the period the insurer of any other owner or operator of another motor 
vehicle that may be liable for damages to the insured, fails to so disclose its coverage. As a 
condition precedent to the obligation of the insurer to pay under the supplementary 
uninsured/underinsured motorists insurance coverage, the limits of liability of all bodily injury 
liability bonds or insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident shall be exhausted 
by payment of judgments or settlements. 
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(B) In addition to the notice provided, upon issuance of a policy of motor vehicle liability 
insurance pursuant to regulations promulgated by the superintendent, insurers shall notify 
insureds, in wri t ing, of the availability of supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorists 
coverage. Such notification shall contain an explanation of supplementary 
uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage and the amounts in which it can be purchased. 
Subsequently, a notification of availability shall be provided at least once a year and may be 
simplified pursuant to regulations promulgated by the superintendent, but must include a 
concise statement that supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage is 
available, an explanation of such coverage, and the coverage limits that can be purchased 
from the insurer. 
(3) The protection provided by this subsection shall not apply to any cause of action by an 
insured person arising out of a motor vehicle accident occurring in this state against a person 
whose identity is unascertainable, unless the bodily injury to the insured person arose out of 
physical contact of the motor vehicle causing the injury with the insured person or with a 
motor vehicle which the insured person was occupying (meaning in or upon or entering into 
or alighting from) at the time of the accident. 
(4) An insurer shall give notice to the commissioner of motor vehicles of the entry of any 
judgment upon which a claim is made against such insurer under this subsection and of the 
payment or settlement of any claim by the insurer. 
(g) No policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured because 
of death of or injuries to his or her spouse or because of injury to, or destruction of property 
of his or her spouse unless express provision relating specifically thereto is included in the 
policy. This exclusion shall apply only where the injured spouse, to be entitled to recover, 
must prove the culpable conduct of the insured spouse. 
(h) In this section, the term "insurance upon any property or risk located in this state" 
includes insurance against legal liability arising out of the ownership, operation or 
maintenance of any vehicle which is principally garaged or principally used in this state, or 
arising out of the ownership, operation, use or maintenance of any property which is 
principally kept or principally used in this state, or arising out of any other activity which is 
principally carried on in this state. 
(i) Except as provided in subsection (j) of this section, the provisions of this section shall not 
apply to any policy or contract of insurance in so far as it covers the liability of an employer 
for workers' compensation, if such contract is governed by the provisions of section fifty-four 
of the workers' compensation law, or by any similar law of another state, province or country, 
nor to the kinds of insurances set forth in paragraph three of subsection (b) of section two 
thousand one hundred seventeen of this chapter. 
(j) (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter or any other law to the contrary, 
every policy providing comprehensive personal liability insurance on a one, two, three or four 
family owner-occupied dwelling, issued or renewed in this state on and after the effective 
date of this subsection shall provide for coverage against liability for the payment of any 
obligation, which the policyholder may incur pursuant to the provisions of the workers' 
compensation law, to an employee arising out of and in the course of employment of less 
than forty hours per week, in and about such residences of the policyholder in this state. 
Such coverage shall provide for the benefits in the standard workers' compensation policy 
issued in this state. No one who purchases a policy providing comprehensive personal liability 
insurance shall be deemed to have elected to cover under the workers' compensation law any 
employee who is not required, under the provisions of such law, to be covered. 
(2) The term "policyholder" as used in this subsection shall be limited to an individual or 
individuals as defined by the terms of the policy, but shall not include corporate or other 
business entities or an individual who has or individuals who have in effect a workers' 
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compensation policy which covers employees working in and about his or their residence. 
(3) Every insurer who is licensed by the superintendent to issue homeowners or other policies 
providing comprehensive personal liability insurance in this state shall also be deemed to be 
licensed to transact workers' compensation insurance for the purpose of covering those 
persons specified in this subsection. 
HISTORY: 
Add, L 1984, ch 367, § 1, eff Sept 1, 1984. 
Sub (f), par (1), amd, L 1995, ch 305, § 1, eff Jan 1, 1996 (see 1995 note below). 
Sub (f), par (2), subpar (A), formerly entire sub (f), par (2), so designated sub (f) , par (2), 
subpar (A), L 1994, ch 425, § 2, eff Oct 18, 1994. 
Sub (f), par (2) [first setout], subpar (A), amd, L 1997, ch 547, § 2, eff Jan 8, 1998. 
Sub (f), par (2) [first setout], subpar (B), add, L 1994, ch 425, § 2; amd, L 1997, ch 547, § 
2, eff Jan 8, 1998. 
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NOTES: 
EDITOR'S NOTES: 
This section formerly appeared, in part, as Ins § 167 which was added by L 1939, ch 882; 
amd, L 1940, ch 507; L 1941, ch 627; L 1945, ch 409; L 1958, ch 577, 759; L 1959, chs 
162, 649; L 1962, ch 825; L 1965, ch 322; L 1967, ch 139; L 1975, ch 775; L 1976, ch 616; 
L 1977, ch 892; L 1979, ch 665; L 1981, ch 435; L 1984, ch 540. 
Laws 1994, ch 425, § 1, eff Oct 18, 1994, provides as follows: 
Section 1. Legislative intent. The legislature hereby finds and declares that a substantial 
segment of the public labors under certain misconceptions regarding automobile liability 
insurance. Many people fail to realize that their own liability insurance does not provide them 
with certain coverages. Too many people are unaware that what they really need to be 
protected in the event of loss sustained by themselves caused by an uninsured or 
underinsured motorist is uninsured motorist coverage on their own policies. To remedy this, 
policyholders should be given notice of the availability of such coverage. 
Laws 1995, ch 305, § 12, eff July 26, 1995, provides as follows: 
§ 12. This act shall take effect immediately, except that sections one through eleven of this 
act shall take effect January 1, 1996 and shall apply to all accidents occurring on or after 
such date. 
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Addendum 4 
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 60-2.1(c) 
Service Get by LEXSTAT® 
TOC New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations > / / > SUBPART 6Q-2 (REGULATION 35-D) 
SUPPLEMENTARY UNINSURED MOTORISTS INSURANCE > @ 60-2.1 Basics of SUM coverage 
Citation 11 nycrr@60-2.1 
11 NYCRR§ 60-2.1 
NEW YORK CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
* * * THIS DOCUMENT REFLECTS CHANGES RECEIVED THROUGH DECEMBER 7, 2001 * * * 
TITLE 11. INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
CHAPTER I I I . POLICY AND CERTIFICATE PROVISIONS 
SUBCHAPTER B. PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE 
PART 60. MINIMUM PROVISIONS FOR AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES AND 
SUPPLEMENTARY UNINSURED MOTORISTS INSURANCE 
SUBPART 60-2. (REGULATION 35-D) SUPPLEMENTARY UNINSURED MOTORISTS INSURANCE 
11 NYCRR§ 60-2.1 (2001) 
@ 60-2.1 Basics of SUM coverage 
(a) A policyholder should consider purchasing SUM coverage in order to protect against the 
possibility of an accident involving another motor vehicle whose owner or operator was 
negligent and who: 
(1) may have no insurance whatsoever; or 
(2) even if insured, is only insured for third-party bodily injury at relatively low liability limits, 
in comparison to the policyholder's own liability limits for bodily injury sustained by third-
parties. 
(b) By purchasing SUM coverage, which cannot be purchased in an amount exceeding the 
amount of third party liability coverage purchased, the policyholder and any insured under 
the policy can: 
(1) be protected for bodily injury to themselves, up to the limit of the SUM coverage 
purchased; and 
(2) receive from the policyholder's own insurer payment for bodily injury sustained due to the 
negligence of the other motor vehicle's owner or operator. 
(c) The maximum amount payable under the SUM coverage shall be the policy's SUM limit 
reduced and thus offset by motor vehicle bodily injury liability insurance policy or bond 
payments received from, or on behalf of, any negligent party involved in the accident. 
(d) The rate and premium for SUM coverage shall, in accordance with Article 23 of the 
Insurance Law, take into appropriate account the offsetting characteristic of SUM coverage 
stated in subdivision (c) of this section. 
(e) (1) An insurer shall offer: 
(i) SUM limits, in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy with split l imits, up to $ 250,000 
per person per accident and, subject to such limit for one person, $ 500,000 per accident, or 
( I I ) a SUM limit, in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy with a combined single limit, up 
to $ 500,000 per accident. 
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(2) An insurer is not required to offer SUM limits in the motor vehicle liability insurance policy 
in the amounts specified in subparagraphs (i) and (u) of paragraph (1) of this subdivision, if, 
in lieu thereof: 
(i) The insurer offers motor vehicle liability limits in amounts: 
(a) greater than $ 100,000 because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one 
accident, and, subject to such limit for one person, $ 300,000 because of bodily injury to or 
death of two or more persons in any one accident; or 
(b) greater than a combined single limit of $ 300,000 because of bodily injury to or death of 
one or more persons in any one accident; and 
(n) The insurer offers, in the motor vehicle liability policy; 
(a) SUM coverage with split limits of $ 100,000 per person per accident and, subject to such 
limit for one person, $ 300,000 per accident; or 
(b) SUM coverage with a combined single limit of $ 300,000 per accident; and 
(in) The insurer also makes available a personal umbrella liability policy with limits up to at 
least $ 500,000, and the insurer provides SUM coverage in the umbrella policy so that the 
total SUM coverage in the motor vehicle liability insurance policy and the personal umbrella 
liability policy shall be up to at least $ 500,000. 
(3) An insurer may offer SUM limits that exceed the amounts specified in paragraphs (1) or 
(2) of this subdivision. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require an insurer to offer any particular 
minimum or maximum amount of third-party bodily injury liability limits. 
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subdivision, an insurer shall not provide in a 
policy SUM limits in an amount that exceeds the third-party bodily injury liability limits 
offered by the insurer and purchased by the policyholder in that policy. 
Section statutory authority: Insurance Law, § A23 
Part Statutory authority: Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 3 1 1 ; Insurance Law, §§ 201 , 301 , 3420 
Subpart Statutory authority: Insurance Law, §§201, 301 and 3420 
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